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• We study the relation between the diffusion of food standards and the quality of EU imports.
• We find that on average, the diffusion of standards boosts the rate of quality upgrading.
• We find heterogeneity considering primary vs. processed products and ISO vs. non-ISO standards.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper investigates the relationship between the diffusion of EU standards and product quality
upgrading using highly disaggregated import data to the EU in the food industry. Results show that, on
average, the diffusion of EU voluntary standards boosts the rate of quality upgrading. However, the results
are heterogeneous when moving from primary to processed foods, and from ISO to non-ISO standards.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Food standards increasingly govern international food supply
chains. Beside mandatory public standards (established by gov-
ernments), voluntary ones (set by private organizations) are be-
coming increasingly important in global agri-food chains. These
standards may relate to food safety and the integrity of food safety
systems, but can also refer to aspects of food such as provenance,
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.031environmental impact, and animal welfare.1 Voluntary standards
can be either set at the international level or by collective organi-
zations which operate within the boundary of a country (or groups
countries, as in the case of the EU), including industry associa-
tions and non-governmental organizations. Concerning standards
in general, one of the most studied issue is their impact on inter-
national trade. Standards could either act as non-tariff barriers to
trade— constituting impediments to countries’ exports— or as cat-
alysts to trade – leading to export gains, by modernizing the food
1 Examples of EU standards related to food safety and quality are the ones
referred to the traceability in the feed and food chain (ISO 22005), and some
standards at the product level like EN 14104 on the acid value of fat and oil
derivatives or EN ISO 1211 on the fat content of milk. As for the other products’
characteristics, it is worth citing the voluntary standard related to products’ eco-
labeling (EN ISO 14020) and the one on animal welfare (RSPCA Freedom Food).
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nen, 2007). Studies focusing on public standards, such as sanitary
and phytosanitary measures (SPS), in most cases find that they act
as non-tariff barriers to trade (Olper and Raimondi, 2008; Li and
Beghin, 2012). On the contrary, studies based on voluntary stan-
dards often conclude that they have a positive effect on the in-
tensity of trade flows, at least when harmonized standards and
North–North trade are considered. There are, however, several ex-
ceptions (see Blind and Jungmittag, 2005; Swann, 2010; Shepherd
and Wilson, 2013).
Empirically, the trade effect of food standards has been largely
studied within the gravity model framework. However, little
attention has been paid so far to the direct quantification of
the relationship between the diffusion of standards and the rate
of exports’ quality upgrading. This is quite surprising, especially
because the enhancement of traded products is at the heart of
the hypothesis on standards as a catalysts to trade (Maertens and
Swinnen, 2009; Henson et al., 2011).
In this paper, we provide the first broad formal evidence that
the diffusion of (voluntary) standards within the export destina-
tion market systematically affects the rate of quality upgrading of
the imported food products. To this end, we use highly disaggre-
gated data on exports from about 70 countries to the European
Union (EU) for more than 2000 food products. Product quality is
inferred from trade data, using an approach recently developed by
Khandelwal (2010).
Since quality upgrading represents a form of innovation, our
empirical exercise is carried out within the ‘distance to the fron-
tier’ framework of Aghion et al. (2005). This model, which investi-
gates the relation between competition and innovation, has been
recently borrowed by Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) to study the
impact of import tariffs on quality upgrading. According to Aghion
et al. (2005), an increase in competition induces firms (sectors)
that are initially close to the technology frontier to innovate more,
while it reduces the expected rents from innovation for firms (sec-
tors) further away from the frontier. The interplay between these
two forces induces a relationship between competition and inno-
vation that is non-monotonic and conditional to the firm/industry
distance from the technology frontier. In this context, the effect of
standards on quality upgrading should depend on the pro- or anti-
competitive effect of standards. As the effect of standards on trade
and competition is theoretically ambiguous, this relationship is an
empirical open question.
2. Conceptual framework and the empirical model
According to the literature, standards canhave anti-competitive
or pro-competitive effects. From this perspective, at least twomain
hypotheses can be formulated (Blind and Jungmittag, 2005).
First, as discussed in Leland (1979), Hudson and Jones (2003)
and many others, standards can serve as an important quality sig-
nal in trade and thus can make a major contribution to enhanc-
ing products’ competitiveness. Evidence that food standards can
stimulate competitiveness can be found in Maertens and Swinnen
(2009) and Henson et al. (2011). Moreover, standards can help to
overcome the ‘lemons’ problem, namely the fact that incomplete
and asymmetric information on the quality of products can lead
to market failures and to a reduction in average products’ quality
(Leland, 1979). Under this hypothesis, the distance to the frontier
model should predict that the diffusion of standards boosts quality
upgrading in the leading firms/sectors, while hinders it in laggard
firms/sectors.
However, standards may also have negative effects, as they can
raise barriers to entry especially through their high compliance
costs. Indeed, while in principle standards can be considered as a
public good which every producer can use, in practice, due to theirhigh adaptation costs, complying to them is difficult and disad-
vantageous for outsiders with no influence on the standardization
process (Blind and Jungmittag, 2005; Swann, 2010). Moreover, a
peculiarity of many food standards is the fact that they are of-
ten driven by the preferences of consumers, as for the case of
GMOs standards (Vigani et al., 2012). More in general, the anti-
competitive effects of standards may derive, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, from the national political process (Fischer and Serra,
2000; Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011). To the extent to which
standards are protectionist, the distance to the frontier model pre-
dicts a negative relation between their diffusion and the rate of
quality upgrading, especially for firms and products which are
close to the quality frontier.
Empirically, the two concurrent hypotheses summarized above
can be tested following Amiti and Khandelwal (2013). Let DF hcit
be the distance to the frontier of variety hc (product h exported
by country c) imported by the EU country i at time t , namely
the ratio of its quality to the highest quality within the same
product category (CN 8-digit).2 Our strategy is aimed at testing the
following empirical model:
∆ ln λhcit = β1DF hcit−5 + β2STDeuht−5
+β3

DFhcit−5 ∗ STDeuht−5
+ γiXhct−5 + εhcit . (1)
The dependent variable, ∆ ln λFhcit , is the change in a variety’s
quality between period t and t − 5. All the explanatory variables
are lagged of five years. Quality growth is explained by the lagged
proximity to the frontier (DF hcit−5), the (log) lagged number of
EU standards (STDeuht−5) and the interaction term between these
two variables

DFhcit−5 ∗ STDeuht−5

. This interaction term allows for
the possible non-monotonic relationship stressed by the distance
to the frontier theory. Finally, Xhct−5 are controls for exporting
countries characteristics. The error term, εhcit = αhi + αct +
σhcit , includes both importer country-product (αhi) and exporter
country-year (αct) fixed effects, plus an identically distributed
idiosyncratic error (σhcit).3
3. Quality estimate and the data
To estimate quality we replicate the procedure in Khandelwal
(2010) on the EU markets, based on the following equation:
ln(shcit)− ln (s0it) = λ1,hci + λ2,it + αphcit
+ σ ln (nshcit)+ λ3,hcit , (2)
where shcit is the market share of variety hc imported by the EU
country i in year t , and s0it is the market share of the domestic
production. On the right-hand side, λ1,hci is the variety hc fixed
effect, λ2,t is the time effect, and λ3,hcit is the residual. Other right-
hand side variables are the price of the variety hc, phcit , and the
(nest) share of variety hc in total imports for the CN-8 category
h, nshcit .
We estimate Eq. (2) separately for each NACE 4-digit industry
and for all the considered importing countries i (the EU-15
members). The estimation is carried out by using 2SLS, to account
for the potential correlation of the error term, λ3,hcit , with both the
2 Varieties’ distance to the frontier is thus estimated as follows: DF hcit =
λhcit
maxc∈hit (λhcit ) . Note that, for varieties close to the frontier DF hcit will be close to 1,
while for varieties far from the frontier DF hcit will be close to 0.
3 Quality is estimated using a nested logit demand function within each 4
digit country/industry separately (see Section 3); the country-product fixed effects
ensure that the estimation only exploits the variation between comparable quality
estimates. The country-year fixed effects sweep out country-level shocks that affect
competition such as technological shocks, changes in relative endowment, changes
in institutions that affect competition.
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Quality, competition and standards: baseline results.
All products Primary Processed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged ln standard (t − 5) 0.158*** 0.158*** -0.188*** 0.198***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.046) (0.039)
Lagged ln standard * distance to the frontier (t − 5) −0.0090 −0.010* −0.040* −0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.005)
Lagged distance to the frontier (t − 5) −0.503*** −0.458*** −0.394*** −0.470***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.059) (0.046)
Lagged tariffs (t − 5) 0.077** 0.141** 0.067**
(0.029) (0.067) (0.028)
Lagged tariffs * distance to the frontier (t − 5) −0.183*** −0.342*** −0.173***
(0.047) (0.111) (0.052)
Importer-product fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Exporter-year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 226 485 226 485 31 072 195 413
R-sq 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.232
Notes: primary and processed products are classified according to the BEC classification; standard errors are clustered by exporting country (with EU countries treated as
one country because of its common trade policy).
* Significance 0.10.
** Significance 0.05.
*** Significance 0.01.variety’s price and the nest share. Following Khandelwal (2010)
and Colantone and Crinò (2013), price is instrumented by the
interaction between unit transportation costs and the distance
from c andby the interaction between the oil price and the distance
from c; differently, the nest share is instrumented by the number
of varieties exported within the nest and the overall number of
varieties exported by each trading partner to the EU.
The quality of variety hc imported by the EU country i at time
t, λˆhcit , is then obtained by:
λˆhcit = λˆ1,hci+λˆ2,t + λˆ3,hcit . (3)
When implementing this procedure, we follow closely Khandelwal
(2010) and Colantone and Crinò (2013), which may be consulted
for further details. Differently, for a description and discussion of
the quality estimates and details of the data used, see Curzi et al.
(2013).
We collect data on European standards from the EuropeanUnion
Standard Database (EUSDB). EUSDB provides data on voluntary
standards in force in the European Union from 1995 to 2003. Data
are mapped according to the standard trade HS 4-digit classifica-
tion. EUSDB includes only standards at the community level, hence
excluding national standards set by individual member states. The
EUSDB database also provides information on whether or not a
particular EU standard implements a corresponding international
harmonized, ISO, standard (see Shepherd, 2007, for further de-
tails).4 In order to control for the level of competition that the ex-
porters face in their own country and industry,we use as additional
control the ad valorem tariffs, as in Amiti and Khandelwal (2013).
We collect these data from WITS, at the HS 6-digit level and over
time.
4. Results
Table 1 reports our baseline results about the effect of standards
on quality upgrading. Column 1 shows that the estimated coeffi-
cient of standards is positive and strongly significant for the lin-
ear term, and negative but insignificant for the interactionwith the
4 ISO standards, unlike non-ISO ones, are developed and approved by the
International Standards Organization and supported worldwide. Among the most
popular standards within this category, there are the ISO 9000 family about
quality management and the ISO 14000 one which addresses the Environmental
Management.distance to the frontier variable. Quantitatively, the magnitude of
the economic effect is quite important. A 10% increase in the num-
ber of standards, on average, induces an increase in the rate of qual-
ity upgrading of about 1.6%. Moreover, the negative coefficient of
the lagged proximity to the frontier suggests that varieties far from
the frontier, on average, display a faster rate of quality upgrading.
Column 2 adds to the specification the exporters’ level of tariff
and its interaction with the distance to the frontier. A positive
coefficient on the linear tariff and a negative coefficient on the
interaction term imply that varieties close to the world frontier
are more likely to upgrade quality in response to an increase
in competition (tariffs reduction), while the opposite holds for
varieties far from the frontier. This result is in line with what
Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) find on the US market, thus giving
support to the distance to the frontier framework. However,
more importantly for our purpose, when controlling for tariffs the
effect of standards on quality upgrading holds virtually unaffected,
though it decreases marginally for varieties close to the frontier.
In addition to this, our results allow us to compare the marginal
effect of tariffs with that of standards: while the former is clearly
non-monotonic, the latter holds positive both for varieties far and
close to the frontier, although at a decreasing rate.
Next, because the anti- or pro-competitive effects of standards
can depend on the type of product involved, an interesting
question is whether the results discussed above are heterogeneous
when considering primary vs. processed foods. Indeed, some
evidence from the literature suggests that the negative trade
effects of food standards could be more severe for primary than
for processed food products (Shepherd and Wilson, 2013; Li and
Beghin, 2012). These findings are confirmed by our results. First,
considering primary products (column 3) the effect of standards
turns out to be significantly negative, and more so for varieties
close to the frontier. On the other hand, considering processed
foods (column 4) the effect is positive and stronger in magnitude
with respect to thewhole sample. This appears in linewith the idea
that processed foods are more differentiable than primary ones.
Although the results on the whole sample hide this differentiated
effect of standards, it is clear that the overall positive results are
driven by processed products which represent about 86% of the
observations in our sample.5
5 All the results in Table 1 hold and are robust even when splitting the sample
in OECD and non-OECD exporting countries. These additional results are available
upon request.
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Quality, competition and standards: ISO vs. non-ISO standards.
All countries OECDs Non-OECDs
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged ln ISO standard (t − 5) −0.055*** −0.059*** −0.039
(0.011) (0.012) (0.029)
Lagged ln ISO standard * distance to the frontier (t − 5) −0.028** −0.027* −0.032
(0.012) (0.014) (0.037)
Lagged ln non-ISO standard (t − 5) 0.183*** 0.185*** 0.180***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.032)
Lagged ln non-ISO standard * distance to the frontier (t − 5) −0.002 −0.005 0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.031)
Lagged distance to the frontier (t − 5) −0.472*** −0.483*** −0.380***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.113)
Lagged tariffs (t − 5) 0.055 0.032 0.139**
(0.033) (0.028) (0.056)
Lagged tariffs * distance to the frontier (t − 5) −0.178*** −0.158*** −0.226*
(0.051) (0.047) (0.129)
Importer-product fixed effects YES YES
Exporter-year fixed effects YES YES
Observations 226 485 226 485
R-sq 0.230 0.230
Notes: columns 2–3 estimate separate coefficients for the OECD and non-OECD countries; standard errors are clustered by exporting country (with EU countries treated as
one country because of its common trade policy).
* Significance 0.10.
** Significance 0.05.
*** Significance 0.01.A second issue raised in the literature suggests that the effect of
standards could be heterogeneous when considering ISO vs. non-
ISO standards, as well as the level of countries’ development (Blind
and Jungmittag, 2005; Czubala et al., 2009; Shepherd and Wilson,
2013). In Table 2 we study these hypotheses in depth. In column
1, when comparing ISO and non-ISO standards, the effect on the
rate of quality upgrading is the opposite, namely significantly
negative for ISO standards (and increasing so when approaching
to the frontier) and significantly positive for non-ISO standards
(no matter the distance to the frontier). Note, moreover, that the
(absolute) magnitude of the economic effect for non-ISO standards
is more than three times higher. In addition to this, when splitting
these effects according to the different level of development of
exporting countries (OECDs vs. non-OECDs), the main results hold
except for the ISO standards effect on developing countries, which
is still negative but lower in magnitude and not significant.6
The different effect on quality upgrading which emerges when
moving from ISO to non-ISO standards may appear counterintu-
itive at first glance. However, since our product quality measure
is implicitly driven by the market share in the destination coun-
try, after controlling for price (see Section 3), these results come
as no surprise. Indeed, one should consider that complying with
the EU non-ISO standards could represent a valuable strategy to in-
crease the market share in such a demanding market. By contrast,
the negative effect of ISO standards, even if small in magnitude,
makes sense if one considers their characteristics. First, as the re-
sult of an international harmonization process, ISO-standards tend
to be less demanding in terms of compliance requirements. Sec-
ond, they can lead to a reduction of product diversity and thus slow
down the incentives for intra-industry trade (Blind and Jungmittag,
2005). The finding that ISO standards affect negatively the quality
upgrading for trade coming from OECDs, but not for non-OECDs,
gives credence to this interpretation.
6 The results presented above are robust to the following robustness checks:
different definitions of the quality frontier (e.g. excluding the top quality and the
top two quality products; using as an alternative quality measure the percentile
of a variety’s quality within each product–year pair); controlling for the (EU-
15) import tariffs; different combinations of product, country and year dummies;
heterogeneity effect according to institutional variables. These additional results
are available from the authors upon request.5. Conclusions
In this paperwe provide evidence that the effect of the diffusion
of EU food standards on the rate of quality upgrading is, on
average, positive and largely driven by non-ISO standards and
processed foods. At the same time, we showed that the effect
of food standards, unlike that of tariffs, does not depend on the
varieties’ distance to the quality frontier. Indeed, although a non-
monotonic relation comes out from the data, themarginal effect of
standards is overall positive both for varieties close and far from
the frontier. Thus, from this perspective, our results confirm the
mixed effects of standards on competition.
However, we want to stress that the average positive effect
of EU standards on exports quality upgrading of both developed
and developing countries is a new finding, in sharp contrast with
much of the gravity literature that often highlighted the barrier
to trade effect of standards. Clearly, these two results are not
strictly comparable, because they focus on two different concepts,
namely quality upgrading in trade vs. trade flows per se. However,
to the extent to which the quality of exported products matters for
the firms’ export performance, as a large and growing literature
suggests, these findings may have interesting trade and welfare
implications.
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